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ROBERT LAURENCE*

The Abrogation of Indian Treaties
By Federal Statutes Protective of
the Environment
INTRODUCTION
Natural resource exploitation and conservation: these are words of the
1990s. The idea of an oil slick the size of a small state floating near our
most pristine coastline was shocking to many Americans, but no more
shocking than the idea that we might, for the sake of the environment,
have to reduce our consumption of oil. Hard choices lie ahead; there are
compromises to be struck, none of which is likely to please all concerned.
Our love of the wilderness and its creatures, our desire to consume energy
and live comfortably, and our tolerance of those who feel differently are
all certain to be tested in the near future.
This article concerns one of the groups of players in that test, America's
Indian tribes and their members. Indians make up quite a small percentage
of the population of the United States,' but the role they play in the
competition for natural resources is one whose importance far out-weighs
their relatively small numbers. This enhanced role flows from two principal sources. They were here first, and that, in a moral sense for some,
entitles the Indians to a greater say in the exploitation and conservation
of the resources that were initially theirs alone. Indian tribes were in quiet
possession of the Americas, governing the land, exploiting its resources,
and conserving its riches long before Europeans, Africans, or Asians
happened upon the place. While it is no doubt true that neither the Indian
governments nor their resource management were as enlightened as utopian thinkers and science fiction writers would have it,2 all indications
are that they were doing the job a long time ago, and doing it no worse
than it is done now. Even putting the law aside, there are those who
believe that morality alone justifies the Indians having a major say in the
matter of resource management, exploitation, and conservation.
Legally, too, the Indians have a role in the determination of how coal
is to be extracted from the ground and what is to become of the bald
*Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.
1. While Indians have been--and will continue to be, no doubt-under-counted in past and future
censuses, roughly a million and a half Indians, or one-half of one percent of the total population of
the United States, is the figure usually used. See generally D. Getches & C. Wilkinson, Federal
Indian Law 1-20 (2d ed. 1986).
2. See Martin, PrehistoricOverkill in Pleistocene Extinctions: The Search for a Cause (Martin

& Wright eds. 1967).
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eagle. This role, as a general matter, is a tribalrole; it belongs to Indians
as groups, and only indirectly to Indians as individuals. Furthermore,
these groups are governments, not private, voluntary organizations like
the Sierra Club, nor state-chartered corporations like Texaco. Finally,
the Supreme Court has recognized the legal significance of the antiquity
of these governments: "It must always be remembered that the various
Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and that their
claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own Government."4 These
governments did not ratify the Constitution of the United States, nor were
they created by it.' Indian tribes are inherently sovereign, meaning that
they do not trace their existence to the United States. As important as
the recognition of that sovereignty by the United States is, tribal sovereignty does not depend on federal recognition.
From the beginning, and continuing late into the last century, Indian
tribes were treated by the United States as states, small "s. "'6 Not as
States of the union, nor as foreign states, but as unique governments
dubbed by John Marshall as domestic, dependant nations." 7 With these
nations, the Colonies, the Confederation, and the United States entered
into treaties, ratified by the Senate after 1789.8 Treaty-making ended in
1871," but the treaties made are still the "supreme law of the land,"'"
upon which the tribes justifiably rely and under which the United States
is justifiably bound." These treaties, and their abrogation, are the topics
of this article.
In particular, this article examines whether treaty rights should be set
aside in the face of a federal statute of general applicability which does
not mention Indian treaties. The conflict here is between the tribe and
the federal government over conservation of the resources. Consider the
3. United States v. Maxuie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-58 (1975).
4. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973) (emphasis added).
5. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
6. See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n., 443 U.S.
658, 675 (1979).
7. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
8. U.S. Const., art. II, § 2, cl.2.
9. Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §71 (1988)).
10. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.2.
II. This sentence is true in the opposite direction, too, that is to say, the tribes are bound by
their treaty promises, upon which the United States has relied. It is a measure of the diminished
power of Indian tribes that it has become an undeniably moot question whether and in what circumstances tribes are able unilaterally to abrogate the treaties.
A note-writer in the Yale Law Journal attempts to make a jurisdictional point out of this fact of
North American life. In arguing that the international law principle of rebus sic stantibus, providing
for unilateral abrogation of treaties when there has been a substantial change in circumstances, ought
not to apply to Indian treaties, he notes: "Treaty termination by one party may free the other party
as well, but ther is no suggestion in the decisions that the Indians are now free to disregard their
obligations." Note, CongressionalAbrogationof Indian Treaties: Reevaluationand Reform, 98 Yale
L.J. 793, 808 (1989).
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following case: A reservation is set out by treaty in the 1850s, guaranteeing the Indians the right to hunt in perpetuity. 2 Time passes. Due
primarily to white encroachment on natural animal habitats, the continued
existence of one species traditionally hunted by the tribe becomes endangered. Congress enacts a statute protecting the species, with little or
no concern about the earlier treaty right. Indians continue to hunt the
animal and are prosecuted under federal law. What results?
It is rarely doubted that the United States has the power, acting alone,
to abrogate treaties, whether between itself and foreign states or itself
and Indian tribes. Limitations on this power are self-imposed, or are part
of the international legal regime. For reasons stated elsewhere, 3 in this
article I am concerned only with those self-imposed limitations, that is
to say, the requirements which must be met, under federal, domestic law,
before a court will find a treaty's terms no longer in force.'
12. This issue is not quite so geographically based as it may appear at first, for many treaties
promised the Indians the rights to hunt or fish in "the usual and accustomed places," which might
include off-reservation sites. See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
13. See Laurence, Learning to Live with the PlenaryPower of Congress over the IndianNations,
30 Ariz. L. Rev. 413, 428-30 (1988).
14. A Note in the Yale Law Journal recently tried to tie these international and domestic issues
together by arguing there ought, as a matter of federal domestic law, to be limitations on the kinds
of abrogations that a court would recognize. Note, CongressionalAbrogation of Indian Treaties:
Reevaluation and Reform, 98 Yale L.J. 793 (1989). The note-writer suggests a rule that would
permit a court to recognize the abrogation of a treaty by a subsequent statute only in the following
circumstances:
1. Where an express statement of abrogation lies on the face of the statute; and
2. Where there exists a justification for abrogation "acceptable for terminating treaties under
international law." Id. at 810.
The express statement requirement has been urged by Indian advocates for a long time, see, e.g.,
Wilkinson & Volkman, JudicialReview of Indian Treaty Abrogation, 63 Calif. L. Rev. 601 (1975),
but United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986), seems to have settled the matter for good against
any such requirement. With respect to the second proposed requirement, the Yale note-writer lists
the following legitimate justifications:
termination under the terms of the treaty or by consent of the parties; implied termination
by a subsequent treaty; denunciation or withdrawal from certain types of treaties, such
as treaties of alliance and commerce; termination as a consequence of a breach by
another party; termination due to a fundamental change in circumstances; and, in
certain situations, termination due to war between the parties.
98 Yale L.J. at 796.
Of those, only fundamentally changed circumstances seem suggestive of current problems with
Indian tribes. But, under international principles, this concept-called rebus sic stantibus, or "while
things thus stand"--is too narrow to allow for most of the abrogations discussed in this article. For
example, "[tihe doctrine includes a 'clean hands' principle, under which the party invoking the
doctrine must not have wrongfully caused the change in circumstances.... Res sic stantibus requires
that the party intending to invoke the doctrine has approached the other parties in a good faith effort
to settle the problem .... " Id. at 810.
In my opinion, these principles of international law, even to the extent that they are enforceable
against nations, are not well-suited to twentieth and twenty-first century problems between the United
States and the tribes within its borders. Any such wholesale application of international law to
American Indian tribes, and any such clean analogy between Indian tribes and foreign nations, is,
I think, hopelessly naive. The day may come when the United States Supreme Court will enjoin a
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Those requirements involve the construction of the abrogating statute
to see what Congress intended in enacting the statute of general applicability. The inquiry has a metaphysical aspect, for in the hard cases,
Congress's intent was focused most directly on matters other than what
impact the statute would have on Indian hunting and fishing rights. The
rules for such an inquiry must honor the promises made, even while
honoring the legitimate power of Congress to respond to matters of immediate, or evolving, national concern. The rules must retrospectively
protect the Indian parties to the treaty, and prospectively allow Indian
lobbyists to play a role in influencing Congress not to cast away the
promises unfairly or without a thought.
Indian advocates are often tempted to say that the rule should be
"Indians always win." After centuries of losing-in ways that surely did
not always meet modem standards ofjustice and fair-dealing, and in ways
that some call genocide 5--4here is some sense to the position that it is
time that the Indians win, win big, and win big for a lengthy period of
time in order to balance the scales. The Supreme Court's rules, however,
are rather less emphatic than "Indians always win," but read correctly
and argued vigorously, they are sufficient for the purpose of protecting
the rights embodied in Indian treaties, for which hard bargains were made
and valuable consideration given.
THE DION "ACTUAL CONSIDERATION AND CHOICE" TEST

It is sometimes clear that Congress intends to undo the commitments
in a previously ratified Indian treaty. In those cases in which it is unable
to gamer the consent required by the treaty's terms, it sometimes sets
out to abrogate unilaterally. These are called "explicit" unilateral abrogations, and they are rather common in the books. 6 It may be that, while
Congress was explicit in its determination to abrogate, the question reclear congressional abrogation of an Indian treaty, or find the treaty still in force, notwithstanding
Congress's best efforts to abrogate it. The day may come when the General Assembly of the United
Nations will admit 350-odd American Indian nations to its membership.
I doubt that I shall see such days. For those with the time and energy to advocate these results,
I have nothing but good wishes. But my task here, and elsewhere, is less grand. I hope to persuade
the courts of the United States that Indian treaties are worthy of respect, that a Congress which
wishes to take back the promises must do so with deliberation, and that courts should look carefully
at those deliberations to see just what they mean. The law of treaty abrogation that has evolved
during the last quarter century is reasonably well designed for this task, though it could be better.
I leave to others wishful thinking about what might be.
Professor Robert A. Williams, Jr. makes the case for the application of international law to
American Indians and other indigenous people in Williams, Encounters on the Frontiersof Inter.
national Human Rights Law: Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World,
1990 Duke LJ. 660.
15. See, e.g., Williams, Documents of Barbarism:The ContemporaryLegacy of EuropeanRacism
and Colonialismin the Narrative Traditions of Federal Indian Law, 31 Ariz. L. Rev. 237 (1989).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
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mains how far the abrogation goes.The cases from the Supreme Court
make clear that the abrogating statute is to be construed from that perspective, with a strong reluctance to find abrogation.'"
But suppose that there is no good evidence that Congress intended to
abrogate Indian treaties. Suppose that Congress had its legislative aim
focused on some other national purpose, such as preserving an endangered
species, or honoring the national bird, or complying with international
treaty obligations protecting migratory birds, or building access roads to
wilderness areas, or any other of the many worthy purposes that Congress
might address. Suppose it is discovered later that the new legislative
scheme infringed in some substantial way on a right guaranteed by treaty.
These are "quiet" unilateral abrogations. How should the statute be
construed when it is not explicit that the statute was intended to abrogate
the treaty at all? Which should control: the statute or the treaty? The
answer lies,, in the first instance, in United States v. Dion. 8
Dwight Dion, Sr. was arrested by agents of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service for selling and offering for sale the feathers and other parts of
various protected birds, and for shooting protected birds.' 9 Among other
defenses, Dion claimed a treaty-protected right to hunt birds on his reservation, notwithstanding federal statutes of broad application that forbade
the hunting and trading of those birds." He was convicted at trial on
most of the counts. The Eighth Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in
part. 21 First it adhered to its view that the Bald Eagle Protection Act was
not a treaty-abrogating act of Congress.' Second, it extended that view
to the Endangered Species Act.'3 Hence, Dion could not be convicted
17. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
18. 476 U.S. at 734. I have nearly made a career out of writing about the Dion case, and the
treatment here overlaps by necessity with some of those earlier writings. See Hanna & Laurence,
Justice Thurgood Marshall and the Problem of Indian Treaty Abrogation, 40 Ark. L. Rev. 797, 829838 (1987); Laurence, The Bald Eagle, the FloridaPanther and the Nation's Word, 4 J. Land Use
& Envir. L. 1 (1988); Laurence, The Abrogation of Indian Treaties by Statutes of GeneralApplicability, 1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 853. For reasons repeatedly stated in those earlier articles, the input
of Tassie Hanna of the New Mexico and District of Columbia bars was important and welcome.
19. The arrest and indictment were actually broader than this, including charges both of shooting
protected birds as well as selling their parts. Dion, 476 U.S. at 735. Several other parties were
caught as well in the federal "sting" operation, see United States v. Dion 752 F2d 1261, 1262 (8th
Cir. 1985) (en banc), reversed in part, 476 U.S. 734 (1986), but only the conviction of Dwight
Dion, Sr. reached the Supreme Court.
20. The treaty under which Dion claimed is the Treaty with the Yancton [sic, an earlier spelling)
Sioux, I I Stat. 743 (1858). The statutes alleged to abrogate that treaty are the Endangered Species
Act, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982 and Supp. II)); the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act, 40 Stat. 755 (codified as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§703-12 (1982)); and the Bald
Eagle Protection Act, 54 Stat. 250 (codified as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668-668d (1982)). See Dion.
476 U.S. at 735-36. The precise holding of the Court was only that the Bald Eagle Protection Act
abrogated the treaty, id. at 745, and, the treaty having been abrogated, that the prosecution under
the Endangered Species Act was not barred by the treaty. id. at 746.
21. The Circuit Court's holding is summarized at Dion, 752 F.2d at 1270.
22. Id. at 1262-63, 1265-69.
23. Id. at 1270.
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for killing birds in violation of those statutes. Third, the court found that
Dion had no treaty protection for commercial dealings in the parts of
birds and so affirmed the convictions for those acts under the Bald Eagle
Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.' The government
appealed and the Supreme Court reversed, reinstating the convictions.75
In Dion, the Court was called upon to determine whether the three
statutes-all largely silent with respect to Indian treaty rights--worked
abrogations of the Yankton treaty and made criminal those actions that
had once been solemnly guaranteed to be protected in perpetuity by the
United States. The Court determined that the Bald Eagle Protection Act
did abrogate the treaty. The treaty having been abrogated, there was no
reason to construe the other two federal conservation statutes.
As is plain, the lower court opinion was the one more protective of
treaty rights. The Eighth Circuit had taken the Dion occasion to reaffirm
its test from United States v. White26 for "quiet" treaty abrogations:
"statutory abrogation of treaty rights can only be accomplished by an
express reference to treaty rights in the statute or in the statute's legislative
history."'2 7 The Ninth Circuit's test was one friendlier to abrogation; it
looked to surrounding circumstances as well as the statute itself and its
express legislative history.'
As there are no express references to Indian treaty abrogation in the
Bald Eagle Protection Act, yet the Supreme Court in Dion found the
treaty abrogated. Thus, the new test is more like the Ninth Circuit's test
than the Eighth's. Compared to the decision below, it is lenient in favor
of abrogations.
In many ways the White test was preferable to Dion's. Congress keeps
a very comprehensive journal. When nothing in the Congressional Record
shows that Congress necessarily knew that the bill under consideration
threatened to alter Indian treaties, it was reasonable, under White, for a
court to decline to find the treaty abrogated. White, after all, did not
require that the resolution of the issue whether to abrogate be expressly
in the legislative history, nor that the determination to abrogate forthrightly
be stated by a resolution of the body or a declaration of the sponsor. It
was enough that the Congressional Record show that the question was
before the body; that some member or staffer, on the floor or in Committee, said something to the effect that "I think there is a problem here
with an Indian treaty."
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 1264-65.
See Dion, 476 U.S. 734.
509 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1974).
Dion, 752 F.2d at 1265 (emphasis removed).

28. See United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1980). For a pre-Dion comparison of
White and Fryberg by an environmental advocate, see M. Bean, The Evolution of National Wildlife
Law (rev. ed. 1983) at 96-97.
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The Supreme Court in Dion found the Yankton treaty abrogated even
though the legislative record made no precise mention of treaties, thus
the bright-line clarity of White has been left behind. Nevertheless, the
Court established a very strict test for "quiet" abrogations and that strictness must not be forgotten in a rush to mourn the passing of the more
protective, and easier to apply, White test. That test, worthy of careful
study, is this:
[wihat isessential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered
the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian
treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve the conflict by abrogating the treaty.2
"Essential" and "clear" stand out as words hard for a court to ignore
when interpreting Dion. Even more important are the phrases "actually
considered" and "chose to

. .

. abrogat[e]." The Dion "actual consid-

eration and choice" test requires that a court seeking to find whether a
treaty was abrogated by a statute of general applicability must find that
Congress actually considered whether or not to abrogate the treaty and
chose to break, without renegotiation, the solemn promises of the government.3t
The "actual consideration and choice" test is one about which Indian

advocates may feel reasonably comfortable. While it is a necessary part
of Dion that the evidence of Congress' choice to abrogate may be circumstantial rather than direct, still it must be "clear" evidence, and it
must be evidence that Congress considered the issue of abrogation. Most
emphatically, it must be the case that Congress actually considered the
problem and chose to abrogate. Assuming that the unanimous Court meant
what it said in Dion - an assumption that seems more than fair 2-- the
"actual consideration and choice test" should remove from a court's
concern arguments about what Congress is imputed to have known, or
29. Dion, 476 U.S. at 739-40.
30. In Judge Lay's dissent in White, the case which originally established the Eighth Circuit's

strict test for treaty abrogation, he stressed "the broad wording and the pervasive purpose which
508 F.2d at 459 (Lay, I., dissenting).
the [Bald Eagle Protection Act] is intended to fulfill ....
The Supreme Court's Dion test, requiring "actual consideration" of the treaty abrogation issue,

surely requires more of a treaty-abrogating statute than "broad wording and pervasive purpose."
Hence, Dion's reversal and the rejection of the White test does not establish Judge Lay's dissent as

the law.
31. My own personal history is to the contrary. In fact, I gave an early "gloom and doom"
appraisal of Dion to my Indian law class. It was only at the insistence of Tassie Hanna, as we
prepared the Arkansas Law Review article cited supra, at note 18, that I was able to emerge from
my jurisprudential funk and concentrate on what the Supreme Court actually said in the case. Between
the two of us, Ms. Hanna deserves the credit for first seeing Dion through an advocate's eyes.
32. See Laurence, Indian Treaties and Their Abrogation by Statutes of General Applicability: A
Not-EntirelyNon PartisanEssay on "Quiet" Abrogation, "Actual" Consideration,and the Unhappy
Reception Given United States v. Dion, 1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 853, 866-67.
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what it should have known, or what it constructively knew, or what it
might have done had it been brought to its attention that a treaty abrogation
was threatened. "Actual consideration and choice" shows a court putting
aside such conjectures and concerning itself instead with what was being
discussed, if not on the floor or in committee, then at least in hallways
and offices and staff meetings.
Of course, as first-year law students struggle to understand, the meaning
of words like "actual consideration" comes less from sources like Webster's or Black's Dictionaries, but rather from Dion itself, and what facts
the Court found there to be evidence clearly showing Congress' actual
consideration of the treaty abrogation issue and the choice to abrogate.
In fact, it is not only first-year law students to whom this lesson comes
slowly. Two courts in Florida, trying to decide whether the treaty rights
of the Seminole Tribe survived the enactment of the Endangered Species
Act, plucked the "actual consideration and choice" test out of Dion,
divorced it from the facts of the case, black-letterized it, and used it in
a way inconsistent with the reasoning of Dion." First, before discussing
those cases, this paper will inspect the Court's reasoning in Dion to show
that "actual" means "actual."
THE "ACTUAL CONSIDERATION AND CHOICE" TEST APPLIED
Dion Itself, and the Abrogation by the Bald Eagle Protection Act'
The Bald Eagle Protection Act, as amended in 1962, explicitly mentions Indians. The statute, while forbidding the taking or selling of both
bald and golden eagles, allows Indians and others to seek permission
from the Secretary of the Interior to take an eagle for religious purposes.35
Given the First Amendment to the Constitution, it is a little difficult to
call this a "generous" exemption, and the actual administration of the
permitting scheme has been even less generous. 6 It does show, however,
that the amending Congress had Indians on its mind.
33. United States v. Billie, 667 F.Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987); State v. Billie, 497 So.2d 889
(Fla. App. 1986).
34. With respect to the Bald Eagle Protection Act in general, see M. Bean, supra note 28, at

89-98.
The Supreme Court's only pre-Dion construction of the Bald Eagle Protection Act was Andrs
v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). The Court there held that the statute permitted theSecretary of the
Interior to regulate the trade in Indian artifacts made of feathers and other parts from birds taken
before passage of the statute. Id. at 63. The Court then held that such a taking did not require a
Just Compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 64.
35. 16 U.S.C. §668a (1.987). Regulations for the permitting scheme are found at 50 C.F.R.
§ 22.22 (1990). The Supreme Court's discussion of the importance of the permitting scheme is found
in Dion, 476 U.S. at 740-44. Permits are also available to take eagles for scientific or exhibition
purposes, 50 C.F.R. §22.21 (1990), to take "depredating eagles," id. at 22.23, and for falconry
purposes, id. at §22.24.
36. No permit had ever been granted to an Indian to take an eagle for religious purposes, at least
not at the time of Dion. See, United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986), Brief of the United States
at 25, n. 28. Instead, the Fish and Wildlife Service maintains an "eagle depository" in which birds
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This does not, however, answer the treaty abrogation question, which
requires an appreciation of the fundamental distinction between the rights
of Indians as individuals and their rights under treaties. Suppose the
permitting scheme in the Bald Eagle Protection Act had mentioned the
exemption for the taking of eagles for religious purposes, but made no
precise mention of Indians. Would the exemption apply to Indians? Surely
yes. Religious freedom is an individual right and the exemption is one
that inures to the benefit of individuals. Indians as individuals are treated
more or less like everyone else, so, as a general principle, statutes of
general applicability-for example, the Internal Revenue Code, Occupational Safety and Health Act, or the Anti-Desecration of the American
Flag Act-apply to Indians unless there is clear evidence that Congress
intended otherwise. Both special application and special non-application
to Indians would have to meet constitutional objections.
Treaty rights are another matter. Treaty rights are group, rather than
individual rights, and they inure principally to the benefit of the tribe,
although it is true that individual members may cloak themselves in their
tribe's rights." Hence, the application of a statute of general applicability
to an individual Indian-the application itself unobjectionable-becomes
problematic when it threatens the treaty rights promised to the group by
the United States. Likewise, the application of a statute of general applicability to the tribe itself may be objectionable.3" Now, as is shown
by the Dion case, the presumption shifts and a court is to presume that
the treaty remains intact unless there is clear evidence of a congressional
abrogation.
Take, for example, the famous case of FederalPower Commission v.
TuscaroraIndian Nation,39 the case in which Justice Black wrote in dissent
that "[gireat nations, like great men, should keep their word." ' The
Power Authority of New York, under license from the F.P.C., sought to
condemn some land held by the tribe in fee simple. No treaty rights were
implicated, so the only question was whether the agency's power of
found dead are kept on ice and dispensed upon request. To assume that a road-killed bald eagle will

satisfy the religious needs of American Indians strikes me as somewhat insensitive, though I note
that no religious use was claimed in Dion itself, Some Indians insist upon taking the eagle as their
religions demand, see U.S. v.Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1303 (D.N.M. 1986), where the testimony
was that the golden eagle had to be taken from Pueblo lands in order to be usable in the defendant's
sacrament.
37. See Dion, 476 U.S. at 738, n.4.
38, See EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1989) (Equal Employment Opportunity
Act does not apply to the tribe as an employer); Donovan v. Navajo Forest Products Indus., 692
F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982) (same, for the Occupational Safety and Health Act).
39. 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
40. Id. at 142 (Black, J., dissenting) I note, with some irony, that President Bush quoted these
words in his inaugural speech in January of 1989. See Inaugural Address, 25 Weekly Comp. of
Presidential Documents 99, 101 (January 20, 1989). There was no indication in that speech that the
new President was referring to the keeping of promises found in Indian treaties, but 1, at least,
intend regularly to remind him of his admonition and whence it came.
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eminent domain extended to Indian lands. The Court held that it did, as
there was no indication that it did not.4 ' Justice Black's eloquence, then,
was a bit misplaced; Tuscarora was not a case in which the nation was
breaking its word, at least not its word embodied in a treaty. Not all
courts, nor indeed, all commentators, 42 have been true to this distinction
over the years.
So, the mention of individual Indians on the face of the Bald Eagle
Protection Act does not settle the question of whether Congress accomplished an abrogation of the Yankton Sioux treaty-protected right to hunt.
Treaties are not mentioned in the statute, and one can imagine a situation
in which Congress might leave treaty rights intact and still permit individual Indians to seek exemption from the prohibition for religious purposes.43 Such an exemption, in fact, might be constitutionally compelled,
even if treaty rights were left intact." Some Indians, of course, do not
have treaty rights, yet still have closely held traditional religious beliefs,
protected by the First Amendment.
Nonetheless, it was the Supreme Court's conclusion in Dion that the
existence of the permitting scheme on the face of the statute was sufficiently strong evidence of actual consideration by Congress of the treaty
issue and of the consequent choice to abrogate. The Court was right.
The permitting scheme is direct evidence that Congress considered the
impact of the Bald Eagle Protection Act on Indians, and there is strong
circumstantial evidence that the 87th Congress was aware that most Indians in the lower 48 states have treaty-protected hunting rights. The
circumstantial evidence of actual consideration could hardly be stronger,
short of an explicit discussion in the Congressional Record. Tribal advocates only marginally stronger than the present writer might say, in
fact, that Dion should be limited to its facts and its construction of the
Bald Eagle Protection Act. These advocates have a decent argument, but
this author does not go that far. It is clear, at least, that about the only
thing short of a direct mention of treaties in the statutory record that will
do would be a mention of treaty Indians on the face of the statute.
The Bilie Cases, and the Problem of the Endangered Species Act:
The first judicial applications of the "actual consideration and choice"
test were sadly inauspicious. In two cases involving the prosecution of
41. Id. at 123.
42. See, sadly, Laurence, The Bald Eagle, the Florida Panther and the Nation's Word, supra
note 18. at 1,3 n.10.
43. Note, "Great Nations, Like Great Men, Should Keep Their Word;" But Do They?, 22 Land
& Water L. Rev. 443, 449-50 (1987).
44. See, e.g. United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986).
45. On the Endangered Species Act in general, see M. Bean, The Evolution of National Wildlife
Law at 329-83 (rev. ed. 1983) at 329-83.
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James Billie, Chief of the Florida Seminole Tribe, the test was used
superficially, as if it were a blackletter aphorism, with none of the sophistication that one hopes the lower courts will apply to Supreme Court
pronouncements.'
The Billie cases involved the conflict between the Endangered Species
Act and the treaties between the United States and the Seminole Tribe.
Chief Billie shot a Florida panther, Felis concolor coryi. The panther is
an animal protected under both state47 and federal " environmental protection laws. Billie's right to hunt is protected under the treaties. 4' Both
the United States and Florida chose to prosecute the Chief. He was
eventually acquitted on both charges,"o but along the way two opinions
were written that set back interests that Indians have in preserving the
rights guaranteed to them under the treaties.
The Supreme Court in Dion had avoided holding that the Endangered
Species Act was a treaty-abrogating act of Congress. Having found that
the Bald Eagle Protection Act had abrogated the right of the Yankton
Sioux to hunt eagles under the treaty, the Court properly refused to decide
whether another statute did the same. The abrogation rule of Dion is not
simply a rule for the resolution of a conflict between a treaty and a later
statute. Rather it is a rule of abrogation: the treaty right to hunt eagles
was destroyed by the subsequent sovereign act of the United States."'
Hence, under the Supreme Court's reasoning, there was no longer any
treaty right.to serve as a defense to any statute, and the prosecution under
the Endangered Species Act could go on without any determination of
whether that Act, by itself, would have abrogated the Yankton treaty or
any treaty.
The Supreme Court, however, indicated quite clearly that it saw the
Endangered Species Act to be a harder case than the Bald Eagle Protection
Act. Perhaps the very act of refusing to decide the question is an indication
of this; even stronger was the Court's agreement with Dion, which noted
*that "the Endangered Species Act and its legislative history... are to
46. United States v. Billie, 667 F.Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987); State v. Billie, 497 So.2d 889
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).

47. Fla. Star. §§ 372.072(3), 372.671 (1988). See State v. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 890.
48. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(IXB), 1538(aXl)(D), 1540(b)(1) (1988). See United States v. Billie,
667 F.Supp. at 1487.
49. The treaties between the United States and the Seminole Tribe are cited in United States v.
Billie, 667 F.Supp. at 1488, n. 2. The reservation of the Seminole Indians who stayed behind when
most of the tribe was removed to Oklahoma was established by Exec. Order No. 1379 (June 18,
1911, President Taft).
50. At the state trial, Billie was acquitted, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1987, at 29, col. 1.Billie's
federal prosecution ended in a mistrial, the jury deadlocked at 7-5 in favor of acquittal. N.Y. Tunes,
Aug. 28, 1987, at 32, col. i. Following the verdict of acquittal in the state prosecution, the Justice

Department dropped the federal prosecution. N.Y. Times, Oct. i1,1987, at28, col. 2.
51. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 745-46.
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a great extent silent regarding Indian hunting rights." 5 2 It was clear after
Dion that a prosecution under some act other than the Bald Eagle Protection Act would raise the question of how far Dion reached. The Billie
cases were those prosecutions.
The Treaty Interpretation Issue
There is a preliminary matter of logical, as well as practical, importance. Does the treaty with the Seminoles, or the treaty with any Indian
tribe, protect the right to hunt now-endangered animals? If not, then why
is it important whether the Act abrogates the treaty? If yes, then what is
to become of the panther?
It is easy enough to say, as this author said in the past, that treaty
protection does not run to endangered species, under the rule that treaties
are to be interpreted as the Indian parties to them would have understood
the promise.53 It is equally easy, and as unenlightening, to say that treaties
do protect the right to hunt even now-endangered animals, because a
promise is a promise.' The actual rule of construction is harder than
either of these blackletter rules, and involves sensitivity to a number of
concerns.
In the first place, observe that the "science of conservation" is as much
politics as it is science. 5 For example, E.O. Wilson, a Harvard biologist,
stated that the loss of genetic and species diversity through the destruction
of natural habitats is a worse event to contemplate-because it is irreversible-than "energy depletion, economic collapse, limited nuclear war
or conquest by a totalitarian government. "I One may admire, or not,
Professor Wilson's perspective, but no one would imagine it to be science,
52. Id. at 745.
53. See Laurence, The Bald Eagle. the Florida Panther and the Nation's Word. supra note 18,
at 8-9.
54. See Comment, Federal Conservation Statutes and the Abrogation of Indian Hunting and
Fishing Rights, 58 U. Colo. L. Rev. 699, 711 (1988).
55. See generally. Smith, Ecological Genesis of Endangered Species: The Philosophy of Preservation, 1976 Ann. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 33:
Ecologists view rarity as a biological concept, but it can also be a cultural concept.
To argue that the extinction of a species means the loss of a particular gene pool or a
component of a natural community may not be nearly as persuasive as to argue that
it means the loss of a cultural artifact.... [Slociety can be rallied to save the bald
eagle (Ialiaeetus leucocephalus), for example, or come to the rescue of whales or
seals. But it is extremely difficult to rally widespread public support to save the bluntnosed leopard lizard (Crotaphytus wislizenii silus). ...
Id. at 34-35. Professor Smith's observations seem borne out by corporate advertising campaigns
such as those of Phillips Petroleum Company, which urge the protection of the bald eagle. See, e.g.,
The eagle has landed, The New Yorker, Nov. 27. 1989 at 15 (advertisement).
56. Council on Environmental Quality, 16th Annual Report (1985) at 273, quoted in Comment,
The International Applicability of Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 29 Santa Clara
L. Rev. 171, 174 n. 12 (1989). To similar effect, see Burning the Book ofNature: Destroying Species
Kills Knowledge. Too. N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1989, at 14. col. 1.
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rather than politics. And as politics, governments may disagree as to what
is the proper course."'
Consider the case of the proper size and duration of the elk hunt in
southern New Mexico.58 North American Elk, Cervus canadensis, are
migratory animals, and both the State of New Mexico and the Mescalero

Apache Tribe are legitimately concerned with their conservation. These
two governments enacted conflicting regulations that governed the hunting
of elk. 9 For example, elk season opened earlier on-reservation than it
did off-reservation, and bag limits were different.

From the perspective of conservation-as-hard-science, it might be possible to decide whether the tribe's or the state's regulations were the
"correct" ones, and to go from there. I doubt it'

Both regulations are as much economic as conservationist, designed
as much to meet the needs of sports hunters and the businesses that serve

them as to.serve the needs of elk.' Even as strictly conservation measures,
both are based upon essentially political determinations of how many elk

are "enough," how many are "too few" and how many are "too many."
From Professor Wilson's perspective, one would guess that too few elk

is a more serious problem than the economic collapse of either the tribe
or the state, but neither government will necessarily see it that way. So
a court having to choose between the regulations must either decide on
the merits between the rules or, jurisdictionally, between the governments.
The Ninth Circuit, in a similar case, decided always to go with the more
conservative rule, on the mistaken assumption that the most conservative

is always the most conservationist."' The Supreme Court, in exactly the
case posed, held for the Mescalero rule, not because it is the better rule,
57. Individuals, as well as governments, appear to make species-specific political determinations
about the desirability of conservation. Professor Stephen Kellert of the Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies surveyed American attitudes about the desirability of species protection if
higher energy costs would result. Eighty-nine percent of the people surveyed favored such protection
of the bald eagle, Haliaeetusleucocephalus. Next highest was the Florida panther, Felis concolor
coryi, at 73%. The lowly cave spider fared the worst, with only 34% of the population willing to
pay higher utility bills in order to save Adelocosa anops. Even the furbish lousewort, Pedicularius
furbishiae, was able to garner a 48% favorable rating. See Kellert, Social and PerceptualFactors
in Endangered Species Management, 49 J. Wildlife Management 528, 531 (1985) (the survey was
conducted in 1980).
58. This hypothetical is drawn from the facts of New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462
U.S. 324 (1983).
59. See id. at 329.
60. For example, see id. at 327, n. 4. See generally Smith, EcologicalGenesis of Endangered
Species: The Philosophyof Preservation, 1976 Ann. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 33, 43-45 (listing the following
"Rationale for Preservation": economic, aesthetic, ethical and ecological). See also Kellert, Social
and PerceptualFactorsin EndangeredSpecies Management, 49 J. Wildlife Management 528, 529
(1985).
61. "As to such hunting and fishing (by non-tribal members on the reservation] the more severe
restrictions, whether originatingwith the State or Tribe, control." U.S. v. Montana, 604 F.2d 1162,
1171 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (emphasis added).
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but because the tribe is the government with the power to decide which
is the better rule. 2
This conservation-as-politics perspective has an impact on issues of
treaty interpretation and abrogation. Because the definition of what, exactly, "endangered" means is partly a political determination, it cannot
go without saying that a treaty does not protect the hunting of an animal
determined by the United States to be "endangered." The treaty may be
bound by hard-boiled science, but why should the United States government's post-treaty political choices affect the interpretation of the treaty,
negotiated and ratified when other political choices were in vogue? Of
course, treaty interpretation aside, the new political choice may lead the
United States to abrogate the treaty unilaterally, subjecting itself to a suit
for damages before the Court of Claims. 3 But, a congressional determination that endangered animals are protected should not, in all cases,
trump a treaty-guaranteed right to hunt, when the statute itself is silent
on the abrogation question.
For example, take now the case of the grizzly bear, Ursus arctos, in
the lower forty-eight states. Within certain habitats, the grizzly is "threatened," a lesser form of vulnerability under the federal rules.' Outside
Alaska, its numbers are in danger of being depleted to the point where
individuals may be so rare that they cannot find each other in order to
mate and sustain the population.' On the other hand, there are many
grizzlies in Alaska, and these bears are genetically indistinguishable from
those that are threatened with extinction in the south."e
62. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
63. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (holding the government
liable in damages for the abrogation of the Fort Laramie Treaty with the Sioux).
64. A species is "threatened" under the Endangered Species Act if it is likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20) (1988). "Endangered" means immediately
threatened with extinction. Id. § 1532(6). The grizzly is listed as "threatened" at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11
(1990). See also § 17.40(b)(2). There are special rules for northwest Montana. See 50 C.F.R.
17.40(b)(l)(iXE) (1990), and the map at 141.
For the scientific definitions of these and similar terms, see Smith, EcologicalGenesis of Endangered Species: The Philosophy of Preservation. 1976 Ann. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 33, 35.
65. See 2 R. Nowak & J.Paradiso, Walker's Mammals of the World at 971-72 (4th ed. 1983)
(for reports of the range and population of the grizzly bear).
66. The systematics of the brown or grizzly bear have caused considerable confusion. Old
World populations have long been recognized to compose a single species, with the
scientific name U. arctosand the general common name brown bear. In North America
the name "grizzly" is applied over most of the range, while the term "big brown
bear" is often used on the coast of southern Alaska and nearby islands, where the
animals average much larger than those inland. [One researcher] listed 77 Latin names
that have been used in the specific sense for different populations of the brown or
grizzly bear in North America. No one now thinks that there are actually so many
species, but some authorities have recognized the North American grizzly (U. horribihs) and the Alaskan big brown bear (U. middendorfi) as species distinct from U.
arctos of the Old World. Other authorities, based on limited systematic work, have
referred the North American brown and grizzly to U. arctos.This procedure is being
used by most persons now studying or writing about bears, and is followed here.
d. at 967 (citations omitted).
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Now, both scientifically and politically, there are reasons to protect the
bears in their southern habitat from depletion. There are certainly conservationists who would argue that importing bears from Alaska to Montana is not equivalent to saving the bears in Montana, even where the
bears are all U. arctos. The concept of "species" itself is somewhat
controversial,67 and the Endangered Species Act surely takes a locationspecific-as well as species-specific-view of endangeredness." A Congress under vigorous environmentalist leadership might choose to abrogate Indian treaties in order to protect southern individuals of U. arcos
from location-specific extinction. But the level of one's vigor with respect
to environmentalism is a political, not a scientific, choice, and there is
no particular reason that old Indian treaties must be interpreted from the
perspective of the most vigorous politico-environmentalist position. This
is especially true because to do so would merely finesse the hard issue:
whether the mere enactment of the Endangered Species Act with no
mention of treaties on the face of the statute or in the legislative history
and the administrative declaration that U. arctos is threatened in Montana
should abrogate a Montana tribe's treaty-right to hunt bears." The answer
to that question might well be "no" if bears of the same species are living
and breeding in Alaska.
The Florida panther, Felis concolor coryi, is a more difficult case. The
panther is a close relative of the western cougar or mountain lion, F.
67. "Species" is defined as follows: "The concept of biological species is based upon gene
exchange by means of sexual reproduction between populations belonging to the same species, and
the absence or rarity of such exchange between populations belonging to different species." T.
Dobzhansky, F. Ayala, G. Stebbins & .. Valentine, Evolution 230 (1977). Earlier in the same work
is found this definition: "Species are a compromise between too much and too little adaptive
conservatism and wasteful innovation. In sexually reproducing organisms, species can be defined
as Mendelian populations, or arrays of Mendelian populations, between which the gene exchange
is limited or prevented by reproductive isolating mechanisms." Id. at 171.
That the concept of "species" is more complicated than non-scientists usually suspect is shown
by the following quotation from the same source:
(Siome species are quite distinct in appearance, and forms transitional between them,
e.g., mankind, the chimpanzee, gorilla, and orangutan, are altogether absent. But
other species are outwardly very similar or identical (sibling species). Still others have
the dividing lines between them blurred by intermediates or hybrids. Finally, some
species are hardly more distinct than races or subspecies of a single species. Hence,
Darwin concluded that "species are only strongly marked and permanent varieties,
and that each species first existed as a variety." This conclusion was not a solution of
the species problem, but it was a seminal idea that served as guiding light in further
study.
Id. at 165-66 (the source of the Darwin quotation is not credited).
68. A species is listed as endangered if it is threatened with extinction through all or a significant
portion of its range, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1988), and the list itself must "specify with respect to
each such species over what portion of its range it is endangered or threatened, and specify any
critical habitat within such range." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c) (1988). With respect to location-specific
endangeredness and the policies that suggest such a result, see M. Bean, supra note 28, at 331-33.
69. 1 know of no particular federal-tribal conflict with respect to grizzly bears in Montana, and
the discussion in the text is only in the nature of a hypothetical. In fact, the Blackfeet Tribe of
Northern Montana is specifically recognized in the federal rules governing the taking of grizzly
bears. See, e.g., 50 C.FR. § 17.40(l)(ii)(B) (1990).
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concolor, so close that few of us could either tell or appreciate the scientific difference between the two.70 But there is a genetic difference, and

that makes the scientific argument here more straightforward than with
respect to the grizzly: once the last F. concolor coryi is gone, there will
be no more, and the importation of F. concolor from the west will not
make Florida whole.
For example, an article in The Nature Conservancy Magazine describes
a recent, so-called "surrogacy" experiment in which five Felis concolor
were brought to Florida, but only to stand in for F. concolor coryi to
determine whether the latter might be reintroduced to "The Pinhook," a
wild area in northern Florida.7 Since F. concolor and F. concolor coryi
can successfully interbreed, any western cougars left behind would threaten
to destroy the sub-species identity of the Florida panther. Thus, in order
to make sure that all the F. concolor could be removed at the end of the
experiment, the experimenters were careful to sterilize the surrogates
before releasing them in Florida. (Inherent in this experiment, of course,
is a lively debate between the animal rightists and the animal preservationists, a debate that this author will observe from afar.)
The experiment seemed to be going well until three of the mountain
lions were killed, two by hunters.
[O]nce the number of experimental animals had dropped to two,
social bonding was lost, and the cougars began to wander well out
of their home ranges. One developed a taste for goat meat; another
was treed in a Jacksonville backyard in April. With the study deadline
so near, biologists decided to recapture the recalcitrant animals.72
Note that in Mr. Middleton's view, it is the cougar that is recalcitrant,
meaning "stubbornly resistant to authority, domination, or guidance," 3
70. The Florida panther is a medium-sized, relatively dark subspecies with short and rather
stiff pelage [or coat]. It is distinguished from other subspecies by its long limbs, small
feet, and rich ferruginous color, particularly in the mid-dorsal region. The skull has
a relatively broad, fiat frontal region with remarkably broad and highly arched or
upwardly expanded nasals. Three external characters are often observed on Florida
panthers which are not found in combination on other subspecies of F. concolor-a
right angle crook at the terminal end of the tail, a whorl of hair--a "cowlick"-in
the middle of the back, and irregular white flecking on the head, nape and shoulders.
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Florida Panther (Felis concolor coryi) Recovery Plan I (1987). See
generally, 2 R. Nowak & J. Paradiso, supra note 65, at 1061-63, 1081-83.
Note also that the classification of the Florida panther has occasionally changed over the years,
the animal previously having been designated F. concolorfloridana,F. concolor coryi Bangs, and
F. arundivaga. "The most recent taxonomic review of the species, as well as detailed descriptions
of each subspecies, including Felis concolor coryi (based on 17 specimens), is [Goldman, Classification of the Races of the Puma in Young & Goldman, The Puma, Mysterious American Cat
(1946)]." Id. The Larousse Encyclopedia of Animal Life 572 (1967) calls the western cougar Panthera
concolor.
71. See Middleton, The Pinhook:A Wilderness Corridor,39 The Nature Conservancy Magazine
12, 15 (No. 5. SeptJOct. 1989).
72. Id.
73. American Heritage Dictionary (1969).
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much as Indians are called recalcitrant for failing to see the wisdom of
Euro-American ways. He pauses not at all over the recalcitrance of the
hunters, presumably non-Indian, who shot two of the five surrogates, nor
over the stubbornness of Florida goat farmers and Jacksonville backyard
owners who have so efficiently destroyed native panther habitats.
Scientific questions involving the possibility of interbreeding, and moral
judgments about the relative recalcitrance of panthers and humans aside,
the political questions become whether F. concolor is "close enough" to
F. concolor coryi, whether we can live with the former when the latter
are gone, and how much we are willing to sacrifice if the answers to
those questions are "no." The legal question is whether a court should
decline to protect F. concolor coryi from Indian treaty-protected hunting
without more explicit guidance from Congress. It ultimately begs that
hard question to interpret the treaty not to protect panther hunting now
that F. concolor coryi-but not F. concolor-is endangered.
Admittedly, there are limits to this "close enough" legislative view of
science. The presumably apocryphal story that the Tennessee legislature
,once declared pi to be 3.0 because that was "close enough" for Tennessee
school kids shows that there are limits to the ability to change science
into politics.7' My point here is only that courts often err in the other
direction, too, and pretend that science is science, and endangered is
endangered, to the detriment of Indians and their hard-won treaties."'
74. 3.0 is the biblical approximation of pi, see I Kings 7:23; 2 Chronicles4:2, so such legislation
would be related to the controversy involving the teaching of "creation science." See P. Beckmann,
A History of Pi 15-16 (3d ed. 1974). Professor Beckmann thinks the Tennessee story is not true,
though he reports that a somewhat similar bill, with no religious aspect, was introduced in the
Indiana Legislature in 1897. Id. at 174. 3.14 is the commonly used approximation of pi in school
work, but because of its transcendental nature (meaning that pi is not the root of any algebraic
equation), the constant cannot be stated precisely with any number of digits. Professor Beckmann
gives pi to 10,000 places in his book. Id. at 201-02. The best modem approximations run to a
million places.
Professor Beckmann, an engineering professor at the University of Colorado, appears to be strongly
of the mind that science is generally distinguishable from politics. In the Preface to the third edition
of his book he writes as follows:
[A] disturbing trend away from science and toward the irrational has set in. The
aerospace industry has been all but dismantled. College enrollment in the hard sciences
and engineering has significantly dropped. The disoriented and the gullible flock in
droves to the various Maharajas of Mumbo Jumbo. Ecology, once a respected scientific
discipline, has become the buzzword offrustrated housewives on messianic ego-trips.
Technology has wounded affluent intellectuals with the ultimate insult: They cannot
understand it any more.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added). These thoughts-and the description of Professor Beckmann on his book's
jacket as "pro-science, pro-technology, pro-free enterprise" with the view that "clean energy can
be made plentiful, but that access to it is blocked by government interference and environmental
paranoia"-prove rather than disprove the "science as politics" point. I would place Drs. Beckmann
and Wilson, see supra note 56, at the opposite ends of that political spectrum.
75. See McGarity, Substantive and ProceduralDiscretionin Administrative Resolution ofScience
Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogensin EPA and OSHA, 67 Geo. L.J. 729,733 (1979): "Many
highly technical questions that are cast in scientific terms cannot for various practical or moral reasons
be answered by science." Id. Professor McGarity quotes Dr. Alvin Weinberg as follows:
Many of the issues which arise in the course of interaction between science or tech-
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It ought not be forgotten that the endangered status of the panther, and
all other endangered animals, is caused by white, not Indian exploitation.76
In the Dion case, the Yankton Sioux reservation in South Dakota made
especially good bald eagle hunting grounds because the reservation is
contiguous with the Karl Mundt Wildlife Refuge. Hence eagles migrate
and hunt across the reservation in larger numbers than they do off-reservation." But it is neither politically nor legally insignificant that the
need for the Karl Mundt Wildlife Refuge comes from white, not Indian,
destruction of eagle habitats.'
Justice Douglas's famous dictum that "[a] treaty does not give the
Indians a federal right to pursue the last living steelhead until it enters
their nets"" is probably true in an abstract, literal sense. But it is rarely
that easy. Even in the Puyallup case from which that famous quotation
comes, there was no evidence that the Indians intended to, or were
inadvertently about to, pursue the last--or even the next-to-the-last, or
the ten-thousandth-to-the-last-steelhead into their nets. And, as shown
above, phrases like "the last steelhead" or "the last grizzly" or "the last
panther" are ones that may not translate easily from science into law.
The difficulty of this translation is shown by the Billie cases.' The
first concern of both courts was whether Billie's right to hunt the Florida
nology and society... hang on the answers to questions which can be asked of science
and yet which cannot be answered by science. I propose the term trans-scientific for
these questions since, though they are, epistemologically speaking, questions of fact
and can be stated in the language of science, they are unanswerable by science; they
transcend science.
Id.. quoting Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 Minerva 209 (1972) (emphasis removed).
See also, Tribe, The Curvature of ConstitutionalSpace: What Lawyers Can Learn from Modern
Physics, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1989); Leflar, PublicAccountabilityandMedical DeviceRegulation,
2 Harv. J.L. & Technology 1 (1989). For an emphatic statement of the opposite view, at least with
respect to physics, that science is clearly distinguishable from politics, see R. Feynmnan, What Do
You Care What Other People Think? in Further Adventures of a Curious Character (R. Leighton,
ed. 1988).
76. The Fish and Wildlife Service listed four present threats to F. concolorcoryi, "not necessarily
in order of priority," as follows: 1. "Low population numbers/depressed genetic viability"; 2.
"Increased human presence"; 3. "Diseases and parasites"; 4. "Reduced prey base." U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, Florida Panther (Fells concolor coryl) Recovery Plan 10-11 (1987).
With respect to the Florida panther, Walker's Mammals of the World, supra note 65, notes:
"Public antipathy seems to have moderated in the last two decades, and the general pattern of decline
may have been halted, but loss of habitatand conflict with agriculturalinterests are still problems."
Id. at 1082 (emphasis added).
77. See Petition for Certiorari at 4, United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
78. P. Deloria, Director of the American Indian Law Center, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, tells
the "Last Porkchop Story" in order to make this point. At a rooming house dining room, the boarders
help themselves to a platter of porkchops, three or four each for every white boarder. At the end of
the table sits the lone Indian boarder and when the platter gets to him, and he reaches for the only
chop left, over-cooked, shriveled-up. Someone up the table says with scorn, "Look at that damn
Indian! He's going to eat the very last porkchop. "
79. Dept. of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 49 (1973).
80. The next several paragraphs of discussion appeared in substantially identical form in Laurence,
The Bald Eagle, the Florida Pantherand the Nation's Word, supra note 18, at I.
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panther was treaty-protected. The courts equivocated, explaining that
modem notions of conservation were limiting factors in the interpretation
of treaties."s Both courts even went so far as to paraphrase Justice Douglas's steelhead trout dictum: "[Congress] could not have intended that
the Indians would have the unfettered right to kill the last handful of
Florida panthers," wrote the federal court.8 2 "The Seminoles do not have
the right to hunt the very last living Florida panther," the state judges

offered. s3

It is difficult to believe that Justice Douglas, even the conservationist
that he was, would have entirely approved of such glib and casual restatements of his thoughts from the Puyallup litigation. South Florida has
surely become an inhospitable range for an animal as wild and predatory
as the panther, but that this circumstance follows white, not Indian, greed,
exploitation, and shortsightedness is self-evident." Panthers are truly in
short supply, but to suggest in such a facile fashion that the Seminoles
in general or Chief Billie in particular are out to exterminate the species,
or indeed that the Chief's taking of one panther for religious purposes
represents such a threat, either by itself or in some unstated aggregation,
is certainly more phrase-making than legal analysis.
The state court's analysis of whether Billie's right to hunt on the Big
Cypress Reservation is limited by conservation concerns does not go
much beyond this phrase-making. It seems entirely contained in the conclusion: "however, the United States Supreme Court has said that an
Indian's right to hunt pursuant to executive order can be regulated by the
need to conserve a species," citing the Puyallup cases.8 5 The analysis is
not that simple. Panthers are not steelhead trout; an anadromous species
of fish that migrates along particular and exact routes is much more
sensitive to Indian harvesting than a predatory mammal of the sub-tropics,
which is apt to roam over a two hundred square mile area, only part of
which is on the reservation. 6 On the other hand, a fish that lays thousands
of eggs may be less vulnerable than a mammal that bears only a few
offspring each year. And surely the existence of steelhead hatcheries must
have some impact on the question of conservation, economics and the
politics thereof. The Eighth Circuit in Dion rightly put the government
81. United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1489 (S.D. Fla. 1987); State v. Billie, 497 So.
2d 889, 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
82. Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1492.
83. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 889, 895.
84. In 1989, an F. concolor coryi was found dead with its liver containing mercury levels high
enough to poison a human. See Mercury spreading in Everglades, Ark. Gazette, Dec. 3, 1989. at
12D, col. 2. In case it does not go without saying, the Seminole and Miccosukee tribes of south
Florida are not well-known as mercury polluters of the waters.
85. Billie, 497 So. 2d at 892.
86. See Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1496. See generally, 2 R. Nowak & J. Paradiso, supra note 65,
at 1081-83.
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to the task of proving that Indian eagle hunting threatened the animal
with extinction;87 the Florida District Court of Appeal's discussion falls
far short of that.
The federal district court's analysis of the question was somewhat more
careful. That court reached the conclusion that
[wihere conservation measures are necessary to protect endangered
wildlife, the Government can intervene on behalf of other federal
interests. The migratory nature of the Florida panther gives Indians,
the states, and the federal Government a common interest in the
preservation of the species. Where the actions of one group can
frustrate the others' efforts at conservation... reasonable, nondiscriminatory measure [sic] may be required to ensure the species'
continued existence."
The key words in that passage are "endangered," "necessary" and
"can frustrate." I have already discussed above how the first word is a
tricky one, representing political as well as scientific decisions. At least
the political dimension of the decision should not work a retroactive
reinterpretation of the treaty. The district court should have devoted some
time to the factual question of whether Seminole hunting of panthers for
religious purposes necessarilyfrustrateslegitimate conservation aims.
In any event, the problem of whether the parties to an Indian treaty
intended to protect the hunting of animals in the wholly unanticipated
event of their becoming endangered is too metaphysical for courts to be
good at solving. Compared to this inquiry, the subsequent one of whether
Congress intended to abrogate a treaty by passing a statute without acknowledging the existence of the treaty becomes almost concrete. That
question will now be addressed as it was presented in the Billie cases.
The Treaty Abrogation Issue
To here, then, the conclusion is that the Eastern Seminoles are possessed
of a treaty right to hunt panthers, notwithstanding that the animal, due
to white exploitation and destruction of panther habitat, is now in danger
of extinction. But for the federal statute, Indian hunting would be unfettered, at least under the domestic law of the United States. No state
statute can abrogate the federally-ratified treaty because of the Supremacy
Clause. The question becomes, then, did this treaty right survive the
enactment of the Endangered Species Act, rightly called "the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever
enacted by any nation?" Because the Endangered Species Act makes
87. See United States v. Dion, 752 F2d 1261, 1268 (1985).
88. Billie, 667 F Supp. at 1490 (citations omitted).
89. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978).
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no mention of the abrogation of Indian treaties on its face, the Dion
"actual consideration and choice" test must give the answer. The task
for the Billie courts, then, was to search for clear evidence that Congress,
in enacting the Endangered Species Act actually considered the problem
and chose to abrogate the treaty.
The federal district court in Billie made all it could of the face of the
statute, but in the end was able to point to few hints of an intent to
abrogate Indian treaties:
[The Endangered Species Act's] general comprehensiveness, its non-

exclusion of Indians, and the limited exceptions for certain Alaskan
natives... demonstrates that Congress considered Indian interests,
balanced them against conservation needs, and defined the extent to
which Indians would be permitted to take protected wildlife.90

Neither the "general comprehensiveness" nor the "non-exclusion of
Indians" gets one anywhere under Dion. Every statute which raises the
issue of the quiet abrogation of treaty rights will have those two characteristics. Furthermore, the reference to "Indian interests," as opposed
to "Indian treaties," in the quotation is telling. They are not the same.
All Indians have "Indian interests"; not all have treaty rights. In fact,
the most well-known example of Indians with individual rights but without
tribally-oriented treaty rights are Alaska natives, 9' mentioned on the face
of the Endangered Species Act, and in the district court's opinion just
above. Alaska natives are without treaty protection.92 These people need
a special mention on the face of the statute to have any rights beyond
those of citizens in general. 93 Hence, the mention of Alaska natives in
the statute has none of the treaty-abrogating force that the mention of
Indians had in the Bald Eagle Protection Act, for most of the Indians
mentioned there were treaty Indians.
The federal district court did not object to Dion's observation, with
the apparent approval of the Supreme Court, that the legislative history
of the Endangered Species Act is largely silent on the subject of Indian
hunting rights." The district court, instead, based much of its holding
on some legislative history of a bill before the House of Representatives
in the 92d Congress. This bill never passed. The Endangered Species
Act was passed by the 93d Congress.
Writing in 1979, Professors Coggins and Modrcin concisely summarized the 92d Congress's deliberations:
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1490.
See generally F. Cohen, Felix Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 739-69 (1982 ed.).
Id. at 739.
Id. at 739-46.
United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 745 (1986).
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No mention of other [than Alaska) Natives was made in the legislation
enacted, but earlier versions of it contained a blanket exemption for
"American Indians, Aleuts, and Eskimos," expressly preserving Indian treaty rights [footnote omitted] or allowed Indian taking only
for subsistence and ceremonial purposes [footnote omitted] ."
The first omitted footnote is a reference to the bill before the House
in the 92d Congress; the second is to the bill in the Senate of the same

Congress."
Perhaps what had been considered by the 92d Congress is some evidence of what was being considered by the 93d; most of the members
carried over from one to the next. Sutherland on Statutory Construction,
however, calls the legislative history of a failed bill "meaningless" and
forbids its use as an extrinsic aid in the construction of a later-enacted
bill.' In any case, is such evidence "clear" evidence, as the Dion Court
required? More to the point, is it convincing evidence that Congress was
actually considering the treaty abrogation issue when it passed the Endangered Species Act?
Professors Coggins and Modrcin believe it is:
That [the] provisions [in the bills before the 92d Congress, mentioned
immediately above] were dropped in the legislative process very
strongly implies that Congress considered an Indian exemption and
consciously chose to override treaty rights in conflict with the ban
on taking endangered species. The implication is somewhat undercut,
however, by a memorandum before the Committee from the Interior
Department suggesting that if Congress chose to "prohibit American
Indians from exercising treaty-secured rights," it should do so "expressly." Even so, the combination of the specific Alaska Native
exemption and the considered failure to enact an exemption for other
Indians virtually requires the conclusion that Congress intended the
Act to cover Indian activities."
These two scholars were writing well in advance of Dion, but they
nicely prefigured the "actual consideration and choice" test in the quotation above. I assume, then, that their conclusion about the abrogating
effect of the Endangered Species Act would remain intact after that case."
The Florida Federal District Court agreed:
95. Coggins & Modrcin, Native American Indians and Federal Wildlife Law, 31 Stan. L. Rev.
375, 404-05 (1979).
96. The House bill was H.R. 13081, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. (1972). This bill never was passed.
The bill in the Senate was S.3199, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), which also failed to pass.
97. Sutherland Stat. Const. §48.01 at 55 (4th ed. 1990 Supp.). Cf. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354, n. 39 (1977); Cassidy v. Minihan, 794 F.2d 340
(8th Cir. 1986) (intent of a subsequent Congress is no indication of the intent of the enacting

Congress).
98. Coggins & Modrcin, supra note 96, at 404-05.
99. 1 might nit-pick the reference to "Indian activities" instead of "Indian-treaty protected activities," but I think the meaning of the paragraph quoted is clear.
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Given the evidence of the [Senate] committee's desire to prohibit
American Indians from continuing hunting and fishing of endangered
or threatened species [citation to the 92d Congress's deliberations
omitted] the court believes that Congress would have also circumscribed non-Alaskan Indians' rights had it intended to preserve them.
Further, the Interior Department advised in connection with H.R.
13081 [in the 92d Congress] that treaty rights would be preserved if
the Alaskan exemption were stricken. In the bill that was passed, it
was not. From this evidence, the court infers that Congress must
have known that the limited Alaskan exemption would be interpreted
to show congressional intent not to exempt other Indians. '"o
The federal judge and the two scholars, then, arrive at the conclusion
that the Act passed by the 93d Congress abrogated the Seminole's treaty.
All agree that there is no mention of Indian treaties in the records of the
93d Congress. All agree that the evidence before the 92d Congress was
equivocal, with at least one source telling the Committees that if the
statute did not abrogate treaties expressly, it might not do so at all.
All in all, when compared with the Dion case, the evidence of Congressional consideration and choice found by the federal court and by the
two scholars falls well short of the mark. There is no evidence that the
93d Congress considered the question of Indian treaty abrogation. The
evidence is clear that the 92d Congress had been warned that, without
an express abrogation clause, Indian treaty rights would survive, and it
is of course clear that the 92d Congress, in the end, enacted no endangered
species law at all. Beyond that, nothing is "clear," not that the 92d
Congress chose to abrogate treaties, nor that the 93d Congress considered
the question at all.
The federal court wrote:
Referring to all Indians, the [Interior Department] official also noted:
Statements made by the Committee indicate its desire to prohibit
American Indians from continuing such hunting or fishing, exemplifying a concern for the perile [sic] of our endangered species
and the presumed inconsistency therewith in permitting American
Indians to perhaps extinguish a species in the name of treaty rights.
[Citation omitted.] The official that [sic, probably "then"] suggested
that, if Congress wanted to eliminate Indian treaty rights, it should
do so "expressly, for the treaty-secured rights in question as well as
those secured to American Indians by Executive Order or Federal
Statute, will nonetheless be preserved to them by the law if Congress
simply deletes [an exemption for consumption and ritual use by
Indians]."',o
Dion, of course, retroactively shows that the Interior department official
was overstating, a bit, in telling the Committee that it would take an
100. United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1491 (S.D. Fla. 1987).

101. Id.
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express mention of treaty rights on the face of the statute to accomplish
any intended abrogation. Nevertheless, Congress was told, pre-Dion, that
an express abrogation was required and chose, in the 93d Congress, to
enact the statute without any such expression. If this is "clear" evidence
in either direction-and the author thinks it is not-the direction ought
to be toward non-abrogation.
The Supreme Court's Dion requirement that evidence of consideration
of abrogation be "clear" ought to restrict a court's attention to matters
that were before the enacting Congress. The Billie federal court's use,
with the prior approval of Professors Coggins and Modrcin, of unpassed
legislation is reminiscent of then-Justice Rehnquist's creative use of unpassed legislation in Oliphantv. Suquamish Indian Tribe"2 and is no more
satisfying. The leading authority on statutory construction notes, "it should
be remembered the statements made by persons in favor of a rejected or
failed bill are meaningless and cannot be used as an extrinsic aid."3 As
a general principle, the use of the legislative history of unpassed legislation is dangerous; when the search is for "clear" evidence of "actual
consideration and choice," it ought never to carry the day.
The most telling bit of the federal court's "evidence" of Congress's
intent to abrogate is its continued reference to "the Act's general comprehensiveness,"'" 4 for it is at this exact point that Dion requires more.
102. 435 U.S. 191, 201-03 (1978) (discussing the Western Territory bill, H.R. Rep. No. 474,
23d Cong., Ist Sess., 36 (1834)).
The danger in using unpassed legislation is shown by comparing Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe,
435 U.S. 191 (1978), with Duro v. Reina, 110 S.Ct. 2053 (1990). In Oliphant, then-Justice Rehnquist
used, in finding an "unspoken assumption" by Congress that tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians, the text of the unpassed Western Territories Bill, cited above. However, in Duro, which
extended Olipham's holding to Indians who are not members of the tribe, Justice Kennedy chose
to ignore another section of the same unpassed bill. The ignored passage would seem to indicate
that Congress's "unspoken assumption" with respect to criminal jurisdiction over non-members was
that such jurisdiction exists. Justice Brennan made this point in dissent in Duro, 110 S.Ct. at 2069,
n. 2. The reconstruction of legislative history, in general, is a slippery enough task, without the
inclusion of unpassed legislation in the calculus, and the Western Territories Bill, in the hands of
Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy shows this as clearly as anything.
103. Sutherland Stat. Const. §48.01 at 67 (4th ed. 1990 Supp.). The treatise cites Troy Gold
Ind., Ltd. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Board, 187 Cal. App. 3d 379, 231 Cal. Rept.
861 (1986). In Troy Gold, the California Court of Appeal wrote this:
[A] single unenacted bill which would have explicitly restricted the Division's mining
jurisdiction is meaningless as an expression of legislative intent as are statements of
the individual legislators in favor of the rejected bill or statements of the Legislative
Analyst accompanying the failed bill suggesting the need for an explicit divestment
of jurisdiction [citations omitted). "The light shed by such unadopted proposals is too
dim to pierce statutory obscurities," much less to create them.
Id. at 868, n. 6, quoting Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento Cry. Bd. of Supervisors, 263
Cal. App. 2d 41, 58, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 492 (1968).
104. Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1491. See also id. at 1488 and 1492. The Florida state court was
impressed, too, by the comprehensiveness of the federal statute, see State v. Billie, 497 So.2d 889,
893, 895 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). Neither court seems daunted by the commitment of the United
States to keep its word to the Indian parties to a treaty.
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The fact that Congress has sought to regulate an area of national concern

is not enough to conclude that Congress actually considered the conflict
with Indian treaties and chose to go back on the old and important promises. It goes without saying that Congress often enacts broad statutes of
wide application addressing worthy purposes; it should be just as obvious

that many, if not most, of these enactments are considered by Congress
to have nothing at all to do with Indian treaties. There is no more important
part of Dion than that "general comprehensiveness" by itself will not
do. 105

The Florida state court's Billie opinion is even less thoughtful than the
federal court's. The state appellate court used a weaker test than Dion
allows: "[Tihe Endangered Species Act abrogates any inherent rights the
Seminole Indians may have for hunting the Florida panther, since only
Alaskan native Indians are specifically exempt from the Act. In expressly
exempting only Alaskan Indians, we must presume Congress did not
intend to exempt any other Indian tribes."'" A non-Indian case was then
cited. 7
A presumption that treaty-protected Seminoles are covered by the statute merely because certain non-treaty Alaska natives are not stands Dion
on its head. The Supreme Court, in fact, wrote nearly the exact opposite:
[w]hat is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered
the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian
treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve the conflict by abrogating the treaty.""
It is reasonably clear that both the state and federal judges saw the
Billie cases as first involving panthers and only secondarily concerning
Indians. For example, the federal court began its analysis by noting, once
again from the Hill case, that the Endangered Species Act is "the most
comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever
enacted by any nation."" And then, for good measure, the court quoted
the same passage again at the close of its analysis."0 The cases might
105. See United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453, 459 (8th Cir. 1974) (Lay, J. dissenting) for the
proposition that the broad application of a statute should be enough to abrogate a treaty. As mentioned
supra note 30, Dion necessarily rejected Judge Lay's approach. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S.
734 (1986).
106. State v. Billie, 497 So.2d at 894 (emphasis added and citations omitted). The Florida court
has made a technical mistake here by equating Alaskan natives with Alaskan Indians, to the possible
offense of Inuits and Aleuts. The error is probably forgivable, though, for a court so far from Alaska.
107. Id. (citing Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978) a leading case on
the Endangered Species Act.)
108. 476 U.S. at 739-40.
109. United States v. Billie. 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1488 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (quoting Hill, 437 U.S.

at 180).
I 10. Id. at 1492.
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have been decided differently if the courts had been made to see them
first as cases involving the nation's solemn word, which has, unhappily,
come into conflict with the future of a proud and endangered beast.
Imagine if the federal district court's first quotation had been not from
Hill, but from Tuscarora: Justice Black on word-keeping, quoted above
at note 40. From this vantage point, it becomes much clearer that the
first question must be the extent of the conflict between the treaty and
the environment: just exactly how much will the panther be harmed by
a decision that keeps the government's word? If the answer is "substantially" then the result in Billie might be justified. But the government
should be put to the proof, or, alternatively, to prove that Congress has
already actuallyconsidered the question and made the choice to abrogate.
This conflict between first viewing the case as a panther case or an
Indian case is seen most clearly in one part of the state court opinion.
Turning at the end to an "additional aspect" of the case, the court briefly
studied a statute which permits the members of the Seminole tribe, under
state law, to hunt in its usual and customary way on the Big Cypress
reservation. ' This would appear to be a good defense to the state prosecution, but the court held that the state endangered species act governed,
as the more specific statute, "because it specifically addresses the subject
of an endangered species, i.e., the Florida panther.""' 2 It is not at all
clear, however, why a statute mentioning panthers but not Seminoles is
more specific than one that mentions Seminoles but not panthers.
The federal district court was truer to Dion; it at least paid lip service
to the correct test,' 3 but it treated the test as if it were a black-letter
statement, divorced from the facts of the case that gave rise to the test.
In particular, the court failed to consider the importance of the permit
scheme that Congress put into place under the Bald Eagle Protection Act
and left off the Endangered Species Act.' " The importance of that scheme
was that it made the circumstantial evidence of Congressional consideration and choice clear rather than presumed, and decreased markedly
the chances that the Court was guessing wrong in finding that Congress
was abrogating the treaty, and sending the nation back upon its word.
Both opinions in the Billie cases are unsatisfactory. The state court
decision is worse, because, finding that Congress made exceptions for
non-treaty Indians, it presumed a treaty abrogation. If any presumption
I 1.

Fla. Stat. Ann. § 380.055(8) (1985).
112. State v. Billie, 497 So.2d at 894.
113. United States v. Billie, 667 F Supp. at 1489, 1491-92.
114. Billie had argued in the federal prosecution that a permit scheme such as Congress placed
in the Bald Eagle Protection Act was necessary to save the Endangered Species Act from an attack
under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause for overbreadth on its face and as applied, United
States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1494. The court rejected the argument, though with little discussion
of the permitting scheme, id. at 1494-97.
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is in order, surely it is the opposite one. The federal court at least used
the correct test, but it undertook none of the careful comparison with the
facts of Dion that the common law reasoning process requires. And it
made entirely too much of the broad application and worthy purpose of
the Endangered Species Act.
In the end, the lesson of the Billie cases is probably that the Eighth
Circuit's White test was a better one than the Supreme Court's in Dion.
White was a bright-line rule; Dion is more flexible, and often that is a
virtue." 5 But, as the Billie cases show as well as any, a little Supreme
Court flexibility goes a long way in the hands of lower court judges. A
search for clear evidence of actual congressional consideration became
too easily a presumption of abrogation, in the hands of the Florida Court
of Appeal. Furthermore, White, itself, had sufficient flexibility. In many
cases where the legislative record shows anything, it will show evidence
going both ways on the abrogation issue. There is little chance that a
court will find itself bound to what it sees as an unjust or unwise result.
It would, perhaps, be unduly restrictive on congressional statute-drafting
to demand that the face of the enactment itself reflect the abrogation, and
Congress does not work in such a way so that the resolution of the conflict
between the goal of the statute and Indian treaties will likely be found
in the Congressional Record. But is it too much to ask that a court not
find a treaty abrogated when the legislative history is entirely silent on
the effect of the statute on Indian treaties? No, it is not.
CONCLUSION

The years beyond 1990 will require new looks at old choices, old
habits, even old promises. It is not in the nature of federal Indian law to
prevent such a reinspection. It has long been settled that a federal court
suit seeking an injunction to prevent a unilateral treaty abrogation by the
United States is non-judiciable." 6 More recent, but equally well-settled,
is the principle that treaty abrogations other than those accompanied by
contemporaneous, good faith attempts to compensate the Indians make
the United States liable for damages before the Claims Court." 7
The interests of Indian tribes in this evolution of conservationist and
exploitative policy require two things-that the judicial branch not reach
quickly to find that Congress has gone back on an old, valuable and
relied-upon promise, and that the Indians have a fair chance to make their
case before Congress for the continued viability of the treaties. As this
115. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 443 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting): "Our
entire profession is trained to attack 'bright lines' the way hounds attack foxes."
116. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
117. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
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article has shown, Dion establishes a judicial test consistent with those
needs. It could be more protective, even as it could be less. It surely is
not too strong. Whether it is protective enough will likely depend on the
ability of tribal advocates to prevent the dilution of the test in the hands
of lower court judges.

